The analysis provides conditions under which Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) choose efficient technology … standards. I introduce a two-stage game with both voting and market competition. In equilibrium, standards and market outcomes … are efficient even with market power from scarce capacity and Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). I show that a drastic …

patents (SEPs). I analyze the effects of injunctions and potential court-imposed FRAND rates on negotiated royalty rates. The …

At which stage in the production chain should patent licensing takes place? In this paper we show that under realistic … circumstances a patent holder would be better off by licensing downstream. This occurs when the licensing revenue can depend on the … when, instead, we assume that the downstream licensee is less informed about the validity of the patent. In most cases …

stakeholders. Patent holdup and holdout directly impacts the innovation and dissemination of patented technology, the harmonization …The interplay between patents and standards in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector has been … the extent and impact of patent holdup and holdout in the ICT sector, and then about how to eliminate or reduce these …

Many high technology goods are based on standards that require several essential patents owned by different IP holders … discourages entry and reduces innovation incentives, while horizontal integration always benefits from entry and innovation …