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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009678182
increased wage comparisons within firms with geographically-dispersed managers — firms with the greatest information frictions … prior to the rule change. We report three changes related to compensation after 1992 for division managers. First, within … firms with dispersed managers, division manager pay co-moves more with peer pay and is less sensitive to individual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013082812
We document that firms whose compensation peers experience weak say on pay votes reduce CEO compensation following those votes. Reductions reflect proxy adviser concerns about peers' compensation contracts and are stronger when CEOs receive excess compensation, when they compete more closely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902356
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013399707
We study the role of transparency in a novel three-person profit sharing game in which managers and board directors … compensation, further reducing the revenue share that goes to shareholders. Competition to keep managers further magnifies these …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342181
We investigate the impact of social networks on earnings using a dataset of over 20,000 senior executives of European and US firms. The size of an individual's network of influential former colleagues has a large positive association with current remuneration. An individual at the 75th...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011436060
This paper examines how networks of professional contacts contribute to the development of the careers of executives of North American and European companies. We build a dynamic model of career progression in which career moves may both depend upon existing networks and contribute to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011963522
We study the pay of UK universities chief executives ("vice-chancellors") over a ten year period. Although there is a correlation between pay and performance, with better performing institutions paying higher salaries, we find limited evidence that this relationship is causal; that is, we find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856876
This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949
Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that interests of labor may well – like that of shareholders – aim at securing the long-run survival of the firm. Consequently, employee representatives on the supervisory board could well have an interest in increasing incentive-based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011308423