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We find new equilibria of minimum-revenue core-selecting (MRCS) auctions that, in contrast to previously identified equilibria, involve overbidding - bidding more than one's true value for some packages of goods. With full information, every MRCS auction in every possible setting has equilibria...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010329460
We find new equilibria of minimum-revenue core-selecting (MRCS) auctions that, in contrast to previously identified equilibria, involve overbidding - bidding more than one's true value for some packages of goods. With full information, every MRCS auction in every possible setting has equilibria...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339391
The U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission issued draft Vertical Merger Guidelines on January 10, 2020. In the discussion on vertical merger policy, some commenters have relied on surveys of the empirical economic literature to justify a procompetitive presumption. This comment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012839576
We find new equilibria of minimum-revenue core-selecting (MRCS) auctions that, in contrast to previously identified equilibria, involve overbidding - bidding more than one's true value for some packages of goods. With full information, every MRCS auction in every possible setting has equilibria...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958065
We study a setting in which dynamically arriving items are assigned to waiting agents, who have heterogeneous values for distinct items and heterogeneous outside options. An ideal match would both target items to agents with the worst outside options, and match them to items for which they have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901937
Stable matching mechanisms are used to clear many two-sided markets. In practice, these mechanisms leave many agents on both sides unmatched. What factors determine the number of unmatched agents, and the quality of matches that do form? This paper answers this question, with a particular focus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013005180
Participants in matching markets face search and screening costs when seeking a match. We study how platform design can reduce the effort required to find a suitable partner. We study a game-theoretic model in which "applicants" and "employers" pay costs to search and screen. An important...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014146287
We analyze the k-ticket lottery, which is used to allocate hunting permits in the state of Alaska. Each participant is given k tickets to distribute among lotteries for different types of items. Participants who win multiple items receive their favorite, and new winners are drawn from the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014106829
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012235222
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012235223