We consider a continuous-time financial market with no arbitrage and no transactions costs. In this setting, we introduce two types of perpetual contracts, one in which the payoff to the long side is a fixed function of the underlyers and the long side pays a funding rate to the short side, the...

To reduce household air pollution, improve health outcomes, save nonrenewable biomass, and support local economic development, developing countries are seeking to increase the use of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) as a clean cooking solution. In the absence of targeted subsidies, LPG will not be...

Provides a brief assessment of how natural resource scarcity and global climate change may alter the risk of violent conflict in the future. Resource scarcity to meet basic needs such as food and land and water can be worsened by governmental ineffectiveness, and vulnerability of populations,...

As smart contract platforms autonomously manage billions of dollars of capital, quantifying the portfolio risk that investors engender in these systems is increasingly important. Recent work illustrates that Proof of Stake (PoS) is vulnerable to financial attacks arising from on-chain lending...

This article explains the economics and antitrust of bundling. I first show that popular arguments such as demand complementarities, economies of scope, and price discrimination are not sufficient. I then detail potentially anticompetitive factors such as leverage and opacity. I then use simple...

Measuring the efficiency of the market for a stock is important for a number of reasons, but such measurements have been widely utilized in securities class action litigation, particularly to justify certification of cases as appropriate for class action treatment. We provide a general...

Game theory is the study of situations with multiple decision makers, and each player's payoff depends on what other players do. A multistage game is one in which the decision makers make their decisions in multiple stages

A repeated game is where the stage game is repeated a number of times – the number of repetitions could be finite or infinite. We usually assume that (a) the stage game has a finite number of players, (b) for each player, the set of feasible actions for the stage game is finite, and (c) the...

Price discrimination requires sufficient separability of customers, sufficiently high costs of arbitrage and sufficient market power. It involves transferability of the good and/or transferability of demand. It can be categorized as first degree (or perfect), second degree (or self-selection),...