Nonprofit organizations have been recently mandated to disclose the details of their executives' compensation packages. Contract information is now accessible not only to current and prospective donors, but also to rival nonprofit organizations competing for donations in the fundraising market....

This book is open access under a CC BY-NC 4.0 license. This collected volume represents the final outcome of the COST Action IS1104 "The EU in the new complex geography of economic systems: models, tools and policy evaluation". Visualizing the EU as a complex and multi-layered network, the book...

We identify a mistake in the specification of the demand system used in the strategic delegation model based on market shares by Jansen et al. (2007), whereby the price remains above marginal cost when goods are homogeneous. After amending this aspect, we perform a profit comparison with the...

We show that Miller and Pazgal.s (2001) model of strategic delegation, in which managerial incentives are based upon relative performance, is affected by a non-existence problem which has impact on the price equilibrium. The undercutting incentives generating this result are indeed similar to...

We address two questions. First, does the excess entry result of pure oligopoly hold when firms face a substitute good produced by a public firm? Second, what would be the optimal ownership of the public firm? We find that excess entry still occurs, but the excessiveness is largely mitigated due...

This paper studies a two-sided matching market with intermediation where an incumbent match-maker faces the threat of entry from a potential entrant. When the payoff from matching is complementary in the types of the agents there exists a weak sequential equilibrium, either with entry and market...

The main aim of this paper is to derive properties of an optimal compensation scheme for consumer cooperatives (Coops) in situations of strategic interaction with profitmaximizing firms (PMFs). Our model provides a reason why Coops are less prone than PMFs to pay variable bonuses to their...

The main aim of this paper is to study the propensity of consumer cooperatives (Coops)to use incentive schemes in situations of strategic interaction with profit-maximizing …rms (PMFs). Our model provides a reason why Coops are less prone than PMFs to pay variable bonuses to their managers. We...

The main aim of this paper is to derive properties of an optimal compensation scheme for consumer cooperatives (Coops) in situations of strategic interaction with profit- maximizing firms (PMFs). Our model provides a reason why Coops are less prone than PMFs to pay variable bonuses to their...