This paper analyzes Côte d'Ivoire's experience with telecommunications liberalization and privatization. Côte d'Ivoire privatized its incumbent operator in 1997, and granted the newly privatized firm seven years of fixed-line exclusivity while introducing "managed competition" in the cellular...

Abstract This paper studies the efficiency of collusion between supervisors and supervisees. Building on Tirole (1986)'s results that deterring collusion with infinitely risk averse supervisors is impossible, while it is costless to do so under risk neutrality, we develop here a theory of...

[fre] Théorie des jeux et économie empirique : le cas des données issues d'enchères . par Jean- Jacques Laffont . Le présent article consiste en une revue des travaux appliqués sur données issues d'enchères. Nous passons en revue les principales prédictions des trois modèles de...

[fre] Information et économie publique par Jean- Jacques Laffont . La prise en compte du comportement stratégique des acteurs vis-à-vis de leur information privée et des inefficacités de la décision publique dues au jeu des groupes d'intérêt a conduit à une vision plus réaliste de...

Incentive theory is the most important development in economics in the last forty years. The principal-agent model is the core of this theory. This authoritative collection brings together the essential literature concerning the principal-agent model when no restrictions on the design of the...

As was shown by M. Dewatripont (1986), optimal long-term contracts under asymmetric information are generally not time-consistent. This paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a two-period procurement model with commitment and renegotiation. It also analyzes whether renegotiated long-term...

In modeling disequilibrium macroeconomic systems which one would want to subject to econometric estimation one typically faces the problem of whether the structural model can determine a unique equilibrium. The problem inherits a special form because the regimes in which the equilibria can lie...