We analyze welfare and distributional properties of a two-settlement system consisting of a spot market over a two-node network and a single energy forward contract. We formulate and analyze several models which simulate joint dispatch of energy and transmission resources coordinated by a system...

We make a systematic examination of the options for incorporating environmental adders into auctions for non-utility generation. To date, adders have been a popular tool of some regulators for the planning process, but have not been embraced as a tool for operations. We argue that any rational...

The main thesis of this paper is that passive transmission rights such as Transmission Congestion Contracts (TCCs) that are compensated ex-post based on nodal prices resulting from optimal dispatch by an Independent System Operator (ISO) will be preempted by the strategic bidding of the...

Using a complete information game-theoretic model, we analyze the performance of different electricity auction structures in attaining efficiency (i. e., least-cost dispatch). We find that an auction structure where generators are allowed to bid for load "slices" outperforms an auction structure...