We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these...

We provide a tight bound on the amount of experimentation under the optimal strategy in sequential decision problems. We show the applicability of the result by providing a bound on the cut-off in a one-arm bandit problem.

We study a general model of dynamic games with purely informational externalities. We prove that eventually all motives for experimentation disappear, and provide the exact rate at which experimentation decays. We also provide tight conditions under which players eventually reach a consensus....

We study a model in which each of finitely many agent cares about a given subset of finitely many goods. We provide minimal conditions that ensure the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium price vector - a price vector for which supply meets demand. Copyright Springer-Verlag...