preferences. We characterize the priority structure of courses over students under which stability is consistent with strategy …-proofness or efficiency. We show that stability is compatible with strategy-proofness or efficiency if and only if the priority …

We introduce the notion of group robust stability which requires robustness against a combined manipulation, first … misreporting preferences and then rematching, by any group of students in the school choice type of matching markets. Our first … version of group robust stability, called weak group robust stability. Our main theorem, then, proves that there is a weakly …

condition of strong acyclicity is nearly impossible to satisfy: any priority structure is quasi-cyclic whenever there are two …

The absence of simultaneous cycles is a sufficient condition for the existence of singleton cores. Acyclicity in the …

We introduce a matching model in which agents engage in joint ventures via multilateral contracts. This approach allows … us to consider production complementarities previously outside the scope of matching theory. We show analogues of the …