Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The difference in the … unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenarios: In the first one, firms disclose … quality; in the second one, they send costly signals thereof. Under non-comparative advertising a firm advertises its own …

We embed signaling in the classical Cournot model in which several firms sell a homogeneous good. The quality is known … quantity decision. We characterize the unique signaling Cournot equilibrium in which the price signals quality to the … to all the firms, but only to some buyers. The quantity-setting firms can manipulate the price to signal quality. Because …

Advertising and price have been shown to signal product quality. Most works limit the number of types to high and low … quality. I characterize the optimal separating marketing strategy when both quality and marginal cost are uncertain and …

We consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers have heterogeneous … information: some consumers know both the prices, and quality of the products offered, some know only the prices, and some know … is a perfect indicator of quality. This equilibrium is characterized by dispersion and Pareto-inefficiency of the price/quality …

The quality of output is of great concern to firms, consumers and regulators and yet firms' decisions concerning … quality receive far less attention from economists than quantity or pricing decisions. There is a substantial management … literature on product quality which, to some extent, discusses the costs and benefits of various approaches to product quality …

economic literature. This paper studies regulation in markets where the quality of the experience good is never completely … verifiable by consumers even after purchase. In the proposed model firms can decide the quality of the good: always producing a … high quality good creates a positive externality in the market, but it causes an incentive to the firms to deviate and …

monopoly problem when the price imperfectly signals quality to the uninformed buyers. We then study the effect of noise on …

quality signaling or as a coordination device is described and discussed. The chapter then moves on to an analysis of the …

Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer …