This paper presents a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion,...

We propose a model of charity competition in which informed giving alone can explain quality heterogeneity across similar charities. It is this heterogeneity that also creates the demand for information. In equilibrium, too few donors pay to be informed; but interestingly, informed giving may...

In light of recent evidence, we develop a theory of charitable giving in which donors feel social pressure from a direct solicitation. We show that equilibrium donations are concentrated around a social norm: donors below the norm increase giving while those above the norm reduce it. Despite a...

In this paper, it is attempted to see whether the recent increase in the actual social expenditure can be the one caused by the change in the policy stance of Korean government. IECI is calculated to check this. The initial finding is that the IECI of the welfare expenditure shows the clear...

Based on the “ABC” approach targeted to assess all available sources of financing (official development finance, private investment, domestic resources, and remittances), the Viet Nam country pilot study explores the challenges of transition finance in a middle-income country in the...

The Zambia country pilot study was conducted by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to explore the challenges of transition finance for a commodity-based Least Developed Country (LDC). In particular, debt sustainability concerns are viewed within the context of the shifting financing...

The theoretical consistency and practical applicability of traditional welfare economics has long been subject to controversy. More recently the challenge has been added from evolutionary approaches that the individual preferences on which the welfare calculus is based are themselves subject to...

In elections that take place in a less-than-perfect democracy, incumbency advantages are different from those in mature democracies. The incumbent can prevent credible challengers from running, organize vote fraud, or even physically eliminate his main opponents. At the same time, formally...