We study a controlled experiment in which a bank's loan officers were incentivized based on originated loan volume to encourage prospecting for new business. While treated loan officers did attract new applications, both extensive and intensive margins of loan origination expanded ( 31% new...

A large theoretical literature shows that competition reduces banks' franchise values and induces them to take more risk. Recent research contradicts this result: When banks charge lower rates, their borrowers have an incentive to choose safer investments, so they will in turn be safer. However,...

We exploit the cross-state, cross-time variation in bank tangible capital ratios-brought about by bank branch deregulation on a state-by-state basis-to identify the effects of bank capital pressures on employment and firm dynamics during two waves of changes in bank capital regulation. We show...

This paper examines the role of government guarantees to domestic banks in generating moral hazard in pre-crisis East Asian economies. We test for moral hazard among bank creditors by determining whether protected banks received more funds from creditors than otherwise identical banks that did...