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We show how increased competition in a media market may have implications for the competition between firms that are advertising in that medium. We apply a simple model of a product market with network externalities where firms buy advertising space in a media market and find that there is more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249395
Under the current market structure in the TV industry advertising prices are typically set by TV channels while viewer prices are set by distributors (e.g., cable operators). The latter implies that the distributors partly internalize the competition between the TV channels, since they take into...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008800754
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We consider a model where TV channels transmit advertising, and viewers dislike such commercials. We find that the less differentiated the TV channels’ programs are, the lower is the amount of advertising in equilibrium. Relative to the social optimum, there is underprovision of advertising if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005652181
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This paper analyses how competition between media firms influences the way they are financed. In a setting where monopoly media firms choose to be completely financed by consumer payments, competition may lead the media firms to be financed by advertising as well. The closer substitutes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005652317
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We extend the classical Hotelling location game with exogenously fixed prices to the case where consumers' transportation costs are asymmetric, in the sence that it is more costly for consumer to move in one direction, say on the left (towards 0), than to move to the right (towards1).
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005652395
We introduce learning by doing in a dynamic contest. Contestants compete in an early round and can use the experience gained to reduce effort cost in a subsequent contest. A contest designer can decide how much of the prize mass to distribute in the early contest and how much to leave for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008752520
In this paper we look at motivation over time by setting up a dynamic contest model where winning the fi…rst contest yields an advantage in the second contest. The win advantage introduces an asymmetry into the competition that we …find reduces the expected value to the contestants of being...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010819013