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Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2003

We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance … envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when these costs are high, less …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696268

The Intergenerational Transmission of Risk and Trust Attitudes

Dohmen, Thomas J; Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; Sunde, Uwe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Recent theoretical contributions depart from the usual practice of treating individual attitude endowments as a black box, by assuming that these are shaped by the attitudes of parents and other role models. Attitudes include fundamental preferences such as risk preference, and crucial beliefs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124463

Financial Advice and Stock Market Participation

Georgarakos, Dimitris; Inderst, Roman - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We introduce professional financial advice in households’ choice to hold risky financial assets. Consistent with the predictions from a formal model, we present evidence that households’ trust in financial advice only matters when their perceived own financial capability is low. Instead, for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084072

Incentives Versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Leuven, Edwin; Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sonnemans, Joep; van … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A vast body of empirical studies lends support to the incentive effects of rank-order tournaments. Evidence comes from … tournaments may bias these non-experimental studies, whereas short task duration or lack of distracters may limit the external … where students selected themselves into tournaments with different prizes. Within each tournament the best performing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136509

Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?

Martinez-Miera, David; Repullo, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A large theoretical literature shows that competition reduces banks' franchise values and induces them to take more risk. Recent research contradicts this result: When banks charge lower rates, their borrowers have an incentive to choose safer investments, so they will in turn be safer. However,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124382

Pricing and Trust

Huck, Steffen; Ruchala, Gabriele K.; Tyran, Jean-Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We experimentally examine the effects of flexible and fixed prices in markets for experience goods in which demand is driven by trust. With flexible prices, we observe low prices and high quality in competitive (oligopolistic) markets, and high prices coupled with low quality in non-competitive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792278

Public and Private Insurance with Costly Transactions

Bertola, Giuseppe; Koeniger, Winfried - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We characterize how public insurance schemes are constrained by hidden financial transactions. When non-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs, public transfers are only partly offset by hidden private transactions, and can influence consumption allocation. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682880

Regulatory Competition and Bank Risk Taking

Agur, Itai - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

How damaging is competition between bank regulators? This paper models regulators that compete because they want to supervise more banks. Both banks' risk profiles and their access to wholesale funding are endogenous, leading to rich interactions. The sensitivity of regulatory standards to bank...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577817

The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud and Dynamic Data

Dionne, Georges - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2012

We discuss the difficult question of measuring the effects of asymmetric information problems on resource allocation. Three problems are examined: moral hazard, adverse selection, and asymmetric learning. One theoretical conclusion, drawn by many authors, is that information problems may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010570021

Equilibrium Limited Liability Contracts in a Landlord-Tenant Market

Dam, Kaniska; Pérez-Castrillo, David - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyse an economy with several homogeneous landlords and heterogeneous tenants. We model the landlord- tenant economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the equilibrium of this market. In equilibrium, contracts are Pareto...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851498