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Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2003

We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance … envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when these costs are high, less …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696268

Learning and the Great Moderation

Bullard, James B.; Singh, Aarti - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We study a stylized theory of the volatility reduction in the U.S. after 1984 - the Great Moderation - which attributes part of the stabilization to less volatile shocks and another part to more difficult inference on the part of Bayesian households attempting to learn the latent state of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005048557

Growth, Selection and Appropriate Contracts

Bonfiglioli, Alessandra; Gancia, Gino A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced tend to choose a sub-optimally...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144738

Rhetoric and Analogies

Aragonès, Enriqueta; Gilboa, Itzhak; Postlewaite, Andrew; … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

The art of rhetoric may be defined as changing other people’s minds (opinions, beliefs) without providing them new information. One technique heavily used by rhetoric employs analogies. Using analogies, one may draw the listener’s attention to similarities between cases and to re-organize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851430

Growth, Selection and Appropriate Contracts

Bonfiglioli, Alessandra; Gancia, Gino - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734223

Does Information Increase Political Support for Pension Reform?

Boeri, Tito; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

An opinion poll on a representative sample of Italian citizens suggests that it does. We focus on reforms that would lengthen retirement age and/or cut pension benefits. After controlling for individual features of the respondent, we find that individuals who are more informed about the costs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662128

Incentives Versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Leuven, Edwin; Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sonnemans, Joep; van … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A vast body of empirical studies lends support to the incentive effects of rank-order tournaments. Evidence comes from … tournaments may bias these non-experimental studies, whereas short task duration or lack of distracters may limit the external … where students selected themselves into tournaments with different prizes. Within each tournament the best performing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136509

Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?

Martinez-Miera, David; Repullo, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A large theoretical literature shows that competition reduces banks' franchise values and induces them to take more risk. Recent research contradicts this result: When banks charge lower rates, their borrowers have an incentive to choose safer investments, so they will in turn be safer. However,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124382

Public and Private Insurance with Costly Transactions

Bertola, Giuseppe; Koeniger, Winfried - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We characterize how public insurance schemes are constrained by hidden financial transactions. When non-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs, public transfers are only partly offset by hidden private transactions, and can influence consumption allocation. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682880

Regulatory Competition and Bank Risk Taking

Agur, Itai - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

How damaging is competition between bank regulators? This paper models regulators that compete because they want to supervise more banks. Both banks' risk profiles and their access to wholesale funding are endogenous, leading to rich interactions. The sensitivity of regulatory standards to bank...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577817