We analyze the problem of coordinating upon asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric game, such as the battle-of-the-sexes. In repeated interaction, asymmetric coordination is possible possible via symmetric repeated game strategies. This requires that players randomize initially and adopt a...

We define social institutions as strategies in some repeated game. With this interpretation in mind, we consider the impact of introducing requirements on strategies which have been viewed as necessary properties for any social institution to endure. The properties we study are finite...

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...

We study experimentally a class of pure coordination games as a special case of the Consumer Choice of Prizes game developed by Rapoport et al. (2000). We find a high level of group coordination coupled with considerable switching in the choice of locations. Two models are proposed and tested to...

Strategic games are considered where the players derive their utilities from participation in certain 'processes.' Two subclasses consisting exclusively of potential games are singled out. In the first, players choose where to participate, but there is a unique way of participation, the same for...

The "Weakest Link" is a game show full of paradox. To increase the probability of winning, contestants should eliminate the strongest players. Yet, if it is anticipated that the best player is to be eliminated, participants do not answer questions correctly and nothing is gained. We solve a game...

We show that a strategy is a Nash equilibrium in a game with a continuum of players if and only if there exists a sequence of finite games such that its restriction is an $\varepsilon_n$-equilibria, with $\varepsilon_n$ converging to zero. In our characterization, the sequence of finite games...

This paper generalizes previous existence results on unidimensional electoral competition, by extending the traditional two-party electoral game to the case where parties have mixed motivations, in the sense that they are interested in winning the election, but also in the policy implemented...

We characterize Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players (Mas-Colell (1984)) in terms of approximate equilibria of large finite games. For the concept of $(\epsilon,\epsilon)$ - equilibrium --- in which the fraction of players not $\epsilon$ - optimizing is less than $\epsilon$ ---...