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The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations

Königstein, Manfred; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005

The labor economics literature has shown that the "efficient bargaining" model, in which wage and employment are negotiated simultaneously, is less frequently used on unionized markets than the less efficient "right-to-manage" model, in which wage is determined via bargaining and employment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822647

Cooperation, Competition, and Risk Attitudes: An Intergenerational Field and Laboratory Experiment

Charness, Gary; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007

behavior of juniors (under 30) and seniors (over 50) in both experiments conducted onsite with the employees of two large firms … external validity of conventional laboratory experiments. In general we do not find strong differences in behavior between … workers and non-workers, indicating that laboratory experiments may not be such a bad approximation for the field environment. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762257

Competition and the Ratchet Effect

Charness, Gary; Kuhn, Peter J.; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

The 'ratchet effect' refers to a situation where a principal uses private information that is revealed by an agent's early actions to the agent's later disadvantage, in a context where binding multi-period contracts are not enforceable. In a simple, context-rich environment, we experimentally...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233858

Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence

Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703358

Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment

Cabrales, Antonio; Charness, Gary; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent of unknown type. In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, while in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703707

Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments

Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance (Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987). However, since the efficiency of performance-related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763542

Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay – An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting

Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004

Variable pay not only creates a link between pay and performance but may also help firms in attracting the more productive employees (Lazear 1986, 2000). However, due to lack of natural data, empirical analyses of the relative importance of the selection and incentive effects of pay schemes are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763609

Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior

Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

friends with other criminals by learning and acquiring proper know-how on the crime business. By taking the social network …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851398

Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player

Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

Finite population non-cooperative games with linear-quadratic utilities, where each player decides how much action she exerts, can be interpreted as a network game with local payoff complementarities, together with a globally uniform payoff substitutability component and an ownconcavity effect....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851489

Aversion to Inequality and Segregating Equilibria

Cabrales, Antonio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals depend not only on their allocations, but also on the well-being of other persons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study the allocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. We show that even small...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547201