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Sequential Equilibria with Infinite Histories

Phelan, Christopher; Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2006

A fundamental non-stationarity of infinitely repeated games as usually studied is that the length of the history of play gets longer each period. With private actions (and mixed strategies) or private signals, this introduces a particular difficulty with common solution concepts such as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051213

The role of information in repeated games with frequent actions

Sannikov, Yuliy; Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2006

We show that the ways incentives can be provided during dynamic interaction depend very crucially on the manner in which players learn information. This conclusion is established in a general stationary environment with noisy public monitoring and frequent actions. The monitoring process can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051223

Rational Multi-Agent Search

Blume, Andreas; Franco, April; Heidhues, Paul - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2006

We study games in which players search for an optimal action profile. All action profiles are either a success, with a payoff of one, or a failure, with a payoff of zero. Players do not know the location of success profiles; instead each player is privately informed about the marginal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051236

Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation

Blume, Andreas; Duffy, John - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2004

We propose to experimentally study decentralized organization learning. Our objective is to understand how learning … members of an organization cope with the confounding effects of the simultaneous learning of other agents. An important … distinction of our approach is that we test predictions from a simple stylized model of organizational learning with fully …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069535