Similar Search Results

Sequential Equilibria with Infinite Histories

Phelan, Christopher; Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2006

A fundamental non-stationarity of infinitely repeated games as usually studied is that the length of the history of play gets longer each period. With private actions (and mixed strategies) or private signals, this introduces a particular difficulty with common solution concepts such as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051213

The role of information in repeated games with frequent actions

Sannikov, Yuliy; Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2006

We show that the ways incentives can be provided during dynamic interaction depend very crucially on the manner in which players learn information. This conclusion is established in a general stationary environment with noisy public monitoring and frequent actions. The monitoring process can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051223

The role of model uncertainty and learning in the U.S. postwar policy response to oil prices

Rondina, Francesca - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

approach proposed by Cogley and Sargent (2005b) to incorporate model uncertainty and learning into policy decisions. In this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547167

Two-sided Learning in New Keynesian Models: Dynamics, (Lack of) Convergence and the Value of Information

Matthes, Christian; Rondina, Francesca - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank (two-sided learning) in a New … these beliefs through a statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study the short-run dynamics … demonstrate that two-sided learning can generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behavior of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011132910