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We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851319
We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851408
, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition …) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547122
We study procedurally fair matching mechanisms that produce stable matchings for the so-called marriage model of one-to-one, two-sided matching. Our main focus is on two such mechanisms: employment by lotto introduced by Aldershof et al. (1999) and the random order mechanism due to Roth and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547153
incompatible concepts of stability (represented by the political economist Adam Smith) and fairness (represented by the political …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547371
In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. Roth and Peranson, 1999). First, we show that the new...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547404
stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547436
We study situations of allocating positions to students based on priorities. An example is the assignment of medical students to hospital residencies on the basis of entrance exams. For markets without couples, e.g., for undergraduate student placement, acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547126
Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547165
We extend Jackson and Watts's (2002) result on the coincidence of S-stochastically stable and core stable networks from marriage problems to roommate problems. In particular, we show that the existence of a side-optimal core stable network, on which the proof of Jackson and Watts (2002, Theorem...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547235