Median Stable Matching for College Admission

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

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Year of publication:	2004-12
Authors:	Klaus, Bettina ; Klijn, Flip
Institutions:	Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)
Subject:	Matching \| College admissions problem \| Stability \| Fairness

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 165
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851408