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The Benefits of Limited Feedback in Organizations

Hansen, Stephen Eliot - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

In most ﬁrms, managers periodically assess workers performance. Evidence suggests that managers with hold information during these reviews, and some observers argue that this necessarily reduces surplus. This paper assesses the validity of this argument when workers have career concerns....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547116

Is Seniority-Based Pay used as a Motivation Device? Evidence from Plant Level Data

Bayo-Moriones, Alberto; Galdon-Sanchez, Jose E.; … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

incentives. They are also less likely to invest in monitoring devices. We also find that firms that offer seniority-based pay are … the provision of incentives. Unlike previous papers, we use a direct measure of seniority-based pay as well as measures of … monitoring devices and piece-rates. We find that firms that offer seniority-based pay are less likely to offer explicit …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851485

Credit Lines: The Other Side of Corporate Liquidity

Ippolito, Filippo; Perez, Ander - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

In this paper we offer the first large sample evidence on the availability and usage of credit lines in U.S. public corporations and use it to re-examine the existing findings on corporate liquidity. We show that the availability of credit lines is widespread and that average undrawn credit is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851340

The Strategic Impact of Resource Flexibility in Business Groups

Cestone, Giacinta; Fumagalli, Chiara - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

We show that in business groups with efficient internal capital markets resources may be channelled to either more or less profitable units. Depending on the amount of internal resources, a group may exit a market in response to increased competition, or channel funds to the subsidiary operating...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547515

Approximate Knowledge of Rationality and Correlated Equilibria

Germano, Fabrizio; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851330

The Distribution of Talent across Contests

Azmat, Ghazala; Möller, Marc - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

Do the contests with the largest prizes attract the most able contestants? Do contestants avoid competition? In this paper we show that the distribution of abilities plays a crucial role in determining contest choice. Positive sorting exist only when the proportion of high ability contestants is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851331

Building an Honest Microfinance Organization: Embezzlement and the Optimality of Rigid Repayment Schedules and Joint Liability

Jeon, Doh-Shin; Menicucci, Domenico - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006

We consider the agency problem of a staff member managing microfinancing programs, who can abuse his discretion to embezzle borrowers' repayments. The fact that most borrowers of microfinancing programs are illiterate and live in rural areas where transportation costs are very high make staff's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851343

Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Two-Sided Matching

He, Yinghua; Miralles, Antonio; Yan, Jianye - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

Using the assignment of students to schools as our leading example, we study many-to-one two-sided matching markets without transfers. Students are endowed with cardinal preferences and schools with ordinal ones, while preferences of both sides need not be strict. Using the idea of a competitive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851345

Government Information Transparency

Albornoz, Facundo; Esteban, Joan; Vanin, Paolo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

This paper studies a model of announcements by a privately informed government about the future state of the economic activity in an economy subject to recurrent shocks and with distortions due to income taxation. Although transparent communication would ex ante be desirable, we find that even a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851347

Price of Anarchy in Sequencing Situations and the Impossibility to Coordinate

Hamers, Herbert; Klijn, Flip; Slikker, Marco - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

Scheduling jobs of decentralized decision makers that are in competition will usually lead to cost inefficiencies. This cost inefficiency is studied using the Price of Anarchy (PoA), i.e., the ratio between the worst Nash equilibrium cost and the cost attained at the centralized optimum. First,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851455