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We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem … implies two folk theorems, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, and provides a sort of converse … of the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange, 1982, Leonard, 1983, Demange and Gale, 1985). …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851337
We consider two-sided many-to-many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010643599
Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the discontinuities of correspondences of standard equilibrium concepts like correlated, Nash, and robust equilibrium, or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resulting equivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547401
We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851319
Using the assignment of students to schools as our leading example, we study many-to-one two-sided matching markets without transfers. Students are endowed with cardinal preferences and schools with ordinal ones, while preferences of both sides need not be strict. Using the idea of a competitive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851345
We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851361
This paper studies a decentralized job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfllled propose to other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851385
We show that the full version of the so-called "rural hospital theorem" generalizes to many-to-many matching problems where agents on both sides of the problem have substitutable and weakly separable preferences. We reinforce our result by showing that when agents' preferences satisfy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851401
We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851408
We observe that three salient solutions to matching, division and house allocation problems are not only (partially) strategy-proof, but (partially) group strategy-proof as well, in appropriate domains of definition. That is the case for the Gale-Shapley mechanism, the uniform rule and the top...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851415