-solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the …

coincide and give the midpoint between the buyers-optimal core allocation and the sellers-optimal core allocation, and thus … they belong to the core. Moreover, under the assumption that all agents in the market are active, the subset of core … set of stable allocations where each agent is paid at least half of his maximum core payoff. All allocations in this last …

matching, a stable set is defined as the union of the core of the game and the core of the subgames that are compatible with … usually defined on the core. …

geometric and algebraic structure of the core, which is always nonempty. We also characterize the extreme points of the core and … we show that prices that are obtained from core allocations are competitive and vice versa. …

We provide a different axiomatization of the core interpreted as a reasonable set (Milnor, 1952) and introduce a new … particular, it is shown that the core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonability, max-intersection and …

matchings. This implies that whenever the core is non-empty (e.g., for marriage markets), a matching is in the core if and only … if it is stochastically stable, i.e., stochastic stability is a characteristic of the core. Several solution concepts … have been proposed to extend the core to all roommate markets (including those with an empty core). An important …

prove that this game has a non-empty core for identical and independent demand processes. Hence, consolidation does not only …