Showing 1 - 10 of 43
fixed number of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the stability and efficiency of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our … main results identify rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guarantee stability or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547129
. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547189
. The respect for priorities ex ante (ex-ante stability) usually precludes ex-ante envy-freeness. Therefore I defi…ne a new … Zeckhauser's (1979) pseudomarket that meets ex-ante stability, no unjustifi…ed lower chances and ex-ante efficiency among agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010692004
Using the assignment of students to schools as our leading example, we study many-to-one two-sided matching markets …-sided matching. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851345
Boston mechanism. Both results have important implications for the efficiency and the stability of the mechanisms. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011132915
We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851319
We show that the full version of the so-called "rural hospital theorem" generalizes to many-to-many matching problems …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851401
We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851408
, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition …) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547122
In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We …. Roth and Peranson, 1999). First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547404