Showing 1 - 10 of 29
coincide and give the midpoint between the buyers-optimal core allocation and the sellers-optimal core allocation, and thus … they belong to the core. Moreover, under the assumption that all agents in the market are active, the subset of core … set of stable allocations where each agent is paid at least half of his maximum core payoff. All allocations in this last …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851444
Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547165
matching, a stable set is defined as the union of the core of the game and the core of the subgames that are compatible with … usually defined on the core. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547178
geometric and algebraic structure of the core, which is always nonempty. We also characterize the extreme points of the core and … we show that prices that are obtained from core allocations are competitive and vice versa. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547213
We provide a different axiomatization of the core interpreted as a reasonable set (Milnor, 1952) and introduce a new … particular, it is shown that the core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonability, max-intersection and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547247
matchings. This implies that whenever the core is non-empty (e.g., for marriage markets), a matching is in the core if and only … if it is stochastically stable, i.e., stochastic stability is a characteristic of the core. Several solution concepts … have been proposed to extend the core to all roommate markets (including those with an empty core). An important …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547341
This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773120
We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851327
In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be ìresting pointsî for a game in the way stable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851378
-solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851496