We show that the full version of the so-called "rural hospital theorem" generalizes to many-to-many matching problems … showing that when agents' preferences satisfy substitutability, the domain of weakly separable preferences is also maximal for …

, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition …) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion …

employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. The first two mechanisms … fixed number of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the stability and efficiency of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our … main results identify rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guarantee stability or …

. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the …

In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We …. Roth and Peranson, 1999). First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when …

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain …. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from 'satisfying' blocking coalitions that … yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to …

We consider two-sided many-to-many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may … mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested …

We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem …