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. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547189
We observe that three salient solutions to matching, division and house allocation problems are not only (partially …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851415
(partially) group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011115552
We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851319
We show that the full version of the so-called "rural hospital theorem" generalizes to many-to-many matching problems …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851401
We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851408
, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition …) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547122
fixed number of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the stability and efficiency of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our … employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. The first two mechanisms … main results identify rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guarantee stability or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547129
In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We …. Roth and Peranson, 1999). First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547404
We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain …. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from 'satisfying' blocking coalitions that … yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547436