Showing 1 - 10 of 72
We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance … envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when these costs are high, less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696268
providing incentives through group versus individual bonus schemes. When workers have a propensity for envy, either scheme may …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696252
I consider the efficiency of liability rules when courts obtain imperfect information about precautionary behavior. I ask what tort rules are consistent with socially efficient precautions, what informational requirements the evidence about the parties' behavior must satisfy, what decision rules...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067689
A worker’s utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer’s income … various assumptions about the object and generality of envy. Envy amplifies the effect of incentives on effort and, therefore …, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make profitsharing optimal, even when the worker’s effort is fully …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765867
We embed learning (without experimentation) in optimal growth. We extend the Mirman-Zilcha results of stochastic optimal growth to the learning case. We use recursive methods to study the effect of learning on the dynamic program by considering the case of iso-elastic utility and linear...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011123764
We study learning in perfect competition. A representative price-taking firm sells a good whose quality is unknown to some buyers. The uninformed buyers use the price to infer information about quality. Even though the firm is a price-taker, information is disseminated though the price. It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010942762
We analyze the complementarity between legal incentives (the threat of being held liable for damages) and normative incentives (the fear of social disapproval or stigma) in situations where instances of misbehavior are not perfectly observable. There may be multiple equilibria within a given...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015241
I examine the case where fulfillment of a contractual commitment is only imperfectly verifiable and ask whether the court should then "tell the truth" regarding the action in dispute. I show that truth seeking does not maximize the expected surplus from contractual relationships. From the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005795971
We argue that the common law standard of proof, given the rules of evidence, does not minimize expected error as usually argued in the legal literature, but may well be efficient from the standpoint of providing maximal incentives for socially desirable behavior. By contrast, civil law's higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696274
We analyze the design of legal principles and procedures for court decision-making in civil litigation. The objective is the provision of appropriate incentives for potential tort-feasors to exert care, when evidence about care is imperfect and may be distorted by the parties. Efficiency is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696309