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We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance … envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when these costs are high, less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696268
Final goods producers, who may be intrinsically honest (a behavioral type) or opportunistic (strategic), play a repeated game of imperfect information with suppliers of an input of variable (and non-verifiable) quality. Returns to cheating are increasing in the proportion of intrinsically honest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005056810
We study the role of information exchange, leadership and coordination in team or partnership structures. For this purpose, we view individuals jointly engaging in productive processes -- a 'team' -- as endowed with individual and privately held information on the joint production process. Once...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010796798
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The causes of the global financial crisis were multi-faceted but revealed still unresolved weaknesses in national and international financial oversight and resolution frameworks. In particular, many governments in the crisis-hit countries had to provide unprecedented levels of support to contain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011245888
Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011245897
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002030628
Firm insiders – a manager and a board – face moral hazard in relation to their outside shareholders in a repeated game with asymmetric information and stochastic market outcomes. The manager determines whether or not outsiders are cheated; the board, whose objectives differ from those of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005056809
Many official groups have endorsed the wider use by emerging market borrowers of contract clauses which allow for a qualified majority of bondholders to restructure repayment terms in the event of financial distress. Some have argued that such clauses will be associated with moral hazard and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005248328
The design of the optimal sovereign insurance contract is analyzed when: the sovereign chooses the contract; effort is not contractible; shocks are of uncertain magnitude; the sovereign can save; and the sovereign can default. Under these conditions: i) an ex ante premium leads to higher coverage;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005263743