Under symmetric information, a job protection law that says that a principal who has hired an agent today must also employ them tomorrow can only reduce the two parties’ total surplus. The law restricts the principal’s possibilities to maximize their profit, which equals the total surplus,...

A new methodology is described which tests between various equilibrium theories of unemployment using matching data. The Paper shows how to correct econometrically for temporal aggregation effects, where the econometrician’s aim is to identify a matching process using data which is recorded...

Unlike many other contracts, employment contracts are subject to various external administrative procedures governing separations, ranging from compulsory severance payments and advance notice periods (usually seniority based), to collective layoff procedures (usually depending on the firm's...

Many workers believe that personal contacts are crucial for obtaining jobs in high-wage sectors. On the other hand, firms in high-wage sectors report using employee referrals because they help provide screening and monitoring of new employees. This Paper develops a matching model that can...

Employment protection systems are known to generate significant distortions in firms’ hiring and firing decisions. We know much less about the impact of these regulations on workers behaviour. The goal of this Paper is to fill in this gap and in particular to assess whether the provision of...

Employment protection is often related to costs incurred by firms when they fire a worker. The stability of the employment relationship, enhanced by employment protection, is also favourable to the productivity of the job. We analyse employment protection focusing on this trade-off between...

This paper analyzes the strikingly different response of unemployment to the Great Recession in France and Spain. Their labor market institutions are similar and their unemployment rates just before the crisis were both around 8%. Yet, in France, unemployment rate has increased by 2 percentage...

We examine how technological change affects wage inequality and unemployment in a calibrated model of matching frictions in the labour market. We distinguish between two polar cases studied in the literature: a ‘creative destruction’ economy where new machines enter chiefly through new...

This paper introduces a labour force participation choice into a standard labour market matching model embedded in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium set-up. The participation choice is modelled as a trade-off between forgoing the expected benefits of being search active and engaging in...

This Paper examines the role of employment protection when firms learn over time about the value of the match. When parties can commit to future wages, equilibrium contracts stipulate positive severance payments as an instrument to induce efficient lay-off decisions and there is no room for...