This paper investigates a Trejos-Wright random matching model of money with a consumer take-it-or-leave-it offer and with individual money holdings in the set {0, 1, 2}. It is shown that three kinds of monetary steady state exist generically: (1) pure-strategy full-support steady states, (2)...

We study the stability of monetary steady states in a random matching model of money where money is indivisible, the bound on individual money holding is finite, and the trading protocol is buyer take-it-or-leave-it offers. The class of steady states we study have a non-full-support...

How would a policy that bans the use of networks in hiring (e.g., anti-old boy network laws) affect welfare? To answer this question, we examine a variant of Galenianos (2013), a version of a random search model with two matching technologies: a standard matching function and worker networks....

We study a model of decentralised bilateral interactions in a small market where one of the sellers has private information about her value. There are two identical buyers and another seller, whose valuation is commonly known to be in between the two possible valuations of the informed seller....

Previous work on the property rights theory of the firm suggests that in the presence of outside options, ownership may be counter productive in motivating managers. This paper shows that this conclusion depends on the assumption that a manager's outside option only depends on her own...

This paper investigates the agenda formation problem by means of two-player two-cake sequential bargaining models. Players differ not only in their time preferences but also for their cake valuations; moreover they face a risk of breakdown in the negotiation process. The main model is...

In this work the determinants of retailers' price-cost margings are investigated using a theoretical model of bilateral bargaining. We use bimonthly data on 36 grocery productes in Italy over the period 1989-1992 to test the theoretical predictions on the effect of vertical relationships on the...

We built a simple alternating offers bargaining model in which one of the players can commit to damage the "pie" they are bargaining over. The unique equilibrium partition his share does not vary monotonically with the discount factor.

This paper provides strategic foundations for the insight that the bargaining power of employees depends on the firms'labour turnover costs.

Rather than a complete survey, this paper aims at being a tool to help apply game theoretic bergaining models to wage negotiations. In this perspective we review a number of articles which explicitly deal with wage determination as well as purely game theoretical models which we believe can be...