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Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2003

We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance … envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when these costs are high, less …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696268

Incentives Versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Leuven, Edwin; Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sonnemans, Joep; van … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A vast body of empirical studies lends support to the incentive effects of rank-order tournaments. Evidence comes from … tournaments may bias these non-experimental studies, whereas short task duration or lack of distracters may limit the external … where students selected themselves into tournaments with different prizes. Within each tournament the best performing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136509

Contingent Capital; Economic Rationale and Design Features

Pazarbasioglu, Ceyla; Zhou, Jian-Ping; Leslé, Vanessa Le; … - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2011

The causes of the global financial crisis were multi-faceted but revealed still unresolved weaknesses in national and international financial oversight and resolution frameworks. In particular, many governments in the crisis-hit countries had to provide unprecedented levels of support to contain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011245888

Crisis Management and Resolution; Early Lessons from the Financial Crisis

Pazarbasioglu, Ceyla; Laeven, Luc; Nedelescu, Oana M.; … - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2011

Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011245897

Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?

Martinez-Miera, David; Repullo, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A large theoretical literature shows that competition reduces banks' franchise values and induces them to take more risk. Recent research contradicts this result: When banks charge lower rates, their borrowers have an incentive to choose safer investments, so they will in turn be safer. However,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124382

Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard; Are Collective Action Clauses Costly?

Becker, Törbjörn I.; Richards, Anthony J.; … - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2001

Many official groups have endorsed the wider use by emerging market borrowers of contract clauses which allow for a qualified majority of bondholders to restructure repayment terms in the event of financial distress. Some have argued that such clauses will be associated with moral hazard and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005248328

Moral Hazard and International Crisis Lending: A Test

Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni; Zettelmeyer, Jeromin; Schnabel, … - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2002

We test for the existence of a moral hazard effect attributable to official crisis lending by analyzing the evolution of sovereign bond spreads in emerging markets before and after the Russian crisis. The nonbailout of Russia in August 1998 is interpreted as an event that decreased the perceived...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005263951

A Model of the Imf As a Coinsurance Arrangement

Chami, Ralph; Shim, Ilhyock; Sharma, Sunil - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2004

The paper shows that a coinsurance arrangement among countries can, in principle, play a useful role in helping countries bear the risks involved in developing their economies and integrating into the global financial system. The operation of the coinsurance arrangement is examined under...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005264158

Trust As a Means of Improving Corporate Governance and Efficiency

Chami, Ralph; Fullenkamp, Connel - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2002

Agency problems within the firm are a significant hindrance to efficiency. We propose trust between coworkers as a superior alternative to the standard tools used to mitigate agency problems: increased monitoring and incentive-based pay. We show how trust induces employees to work harder,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005826212

The Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crises

Laeven, Luc; Valencia, Fabian - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2008

In episodes of significant banking distress or perceived systemic risk to the financial system, policymakers have often opted for issuing blanket guarantees on bank liabilities to stop or avoid widespread bank runs. In theory, blanket guarantees can prevent bank runs if they are credible....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005826542