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Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2003

We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance … envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when these costs are high, less …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696268

Incentives Versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Leuven, Edwin; Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sonnemans, Joep; van … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A vast body of empirical studies lends support to the incentive effects of rank-order tournaments. Evidence comes from … tournaments may bias these non-experimental studies, whereas short task duration or lack of distracters may limit the external … where students selected themselves into tournaments with different prizes. Within each tournament the best performing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136509

Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?

Martinez-Miera, David; Repullo, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A large theoretical literature shows that competition reduces banks' franchise values and induces them to take more risk. Recent research contradicts this result: When banks charge lower rates, their borrowers have an incentive to choose safer investments, so they will in turn be safer. However,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124382

Too Many to Fail - An Analysis of Time Inconsistency in Bank Closure Policies

Acharya, Viral V; Yorulmazer, Tanju - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper shows that bank closure policies suffer from a ‘too-many-to-fail’ problem: when the number of bank failures is large, the regulator finds it ex-post optimal to bail out some or all failed banks, whereas when the number of bank failures is small, failed banks can be acquired by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136753

Efficient Recapitalization

Philippon, Thomas; Schnabl, Philipp - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We analyze public interventions to alleviate debt overhang among private firms when the government has limited information and limited resources. We compare the efficiency of buying equity, purchasing existing assets, and providing debt guarantees. With symmetric information, all the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577813

Regulatory Competition and Bank Risk Taking

Agur, Itai - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

How damaging is competition between bank regulators? This paper models regulators that compete because they want to supervise more banks. Both banks' risk profiles and their access to wholesale funding are endogenous, leading to rich interactions. The sensitivity of regulatory standards to bank...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577817

Public and Private Insurance with Costly Transactions

Bertola, Giuseppe; Koeniger, Winfried - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We characterize how public insurance schemes are constrained by hidden financial transactions. When non-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs, public transfers are only partly offset by hidden private transactions, and can influence consumption allocation. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682880

Bailouts And Moral Hazard: How Implicit Government Guarantees Affect Financial Stability

Mariathasan, Mike; Merrouche, Ouarda; Werger, Charlotte - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

The recent crisis has shown that banks in distress can often expect to benefit from (implicit) government guarantees. This paper analyzes a panel of 781 banks from 90 countries to test whether the expectation of individual and systemic government support induces moral hazard. It shows that banks...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145454

Beyond Liability: An Analysis of Financial Responsibility and Care Decisions in Hazardous Waste Management Facilities

Zhou, Jane - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, … - 2014

To ensure the availability of cleanup funds, federal regulators often require ex ante proof of ability-to-pay for future environmental liabilities. These regulations currently apply to hazardous waste managers under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and are being considered for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011069692

Universal Basic Income versus Unemployment Insurance

Fabre, Alice; Pallage, Stéphane; Zimmermann, Christian - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2014

In this paper we compare the welfare effects of unemployment insurance (UI) with an universal basic income (UBI) system in an economy with idiosyncratic shocks to employment. Both policies provide a safety net in the face of idiosyncratic shocks. While the unemployment insurance program should...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071798