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Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2003

We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance … envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when these costs are high, less …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696268

Learning in a Perfectly Competitive Market

Mirman, Leonard J.; Salgueiro, Egas M.; Santugini, Marc - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2014

We study learning in perfect competition. A representative price-taking firm sells a good whose quality is unknown to some buyers. The uninformed buyers use the price to infer information about quality. Even though the firm is a price-taker, information is disseminated though the price. It is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010942762

Five Open Questions About Prediction Markets

Wolfers, Justin; Zitzewitz, Eric - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Interest in prediction markets has increased in the last decade, driven in part by the hope that these markets will prove to be valuable tools in forecasting, decision-making and risk management - in both the public and private sectors. This paper outlines five open questions in the literature,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504341

On Learning and Growth

Mirman, Leonard J.; Reffett, Kevin; Santugini, Marc - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2013

We embed learning (without experimentation) in optimal growth. We extend the Mirman-Zilcha results of stochastic optimal growth to the learning case. We use recursive methods to study the effect of learning on the dynamic program by considering the case of iso-elastic utility and linear...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011123764

Prediction Markets in Theory and Practice

Wolfers, Justin; Zitzewitz, Eric - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Prediction Markets, sometimes referred to as 'information markets', 'idea futures' or 'event futures', are markets where participants trade contracts whose payoffs are tied to a future event, thereby yielding prices that can be interpreted as market-aggregated forecasts. This article summarizes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662203

Macroeconomic Derivatives: An Initial Analysis of Market-Based Macro Forecasts, Uncertainty and Risk

Gürkaynak, Refet S.; Wolfers, Justin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

September 2002, a new market in 'Economic Derivatives' was launched allowing traders to take positions on future values of several macroeconomic data releases. We provide an initial analysis of the prices of these options. We find that market-based measures of expectations are similar to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656457

Incentives Versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Leuven, Edwin; Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sonnemans, Joep; van … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A vast body of empirical studies lends support to the incentive effects of rank-order tournaments. Evidence comes from … tournaments may bias these non-experimental studies, whereas short task duration or lack of distracters may limit the external … where students selected themselves into tournaments with different prizes. Within each tournament the best performing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136509

Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?

Martinez-Miera, David; Repullo, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A large theoretical literature shows that competition reduces banks' franchise values and induces them to take more risk. Recent research contradicts this result: When banks charge lower rates, their borrowers have an incentive to choose safer investments, so they will in turn be safer. However,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124382

Regulatory Competition and Bank Risk Taking

Agur, Itai - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

How damaging is competition between bank regulators? This paper models regulators that compete because they want to supervise more banks. Both banks' risk profiles and their access to wholesale funding are endogenous, leading to rich interactions. The sensitivity of regulatory standards to bank...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577817

Public and Private Insurance with Costly Transactions

Bertola, Giuseppe; Koeniger, Winfried - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We characterize how public insurance schemes are constrained by hidden financial transactions. When non-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs, public transfers are only partly offset by hidden private transactions, and can influence consumption allocation. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682880