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Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2003

We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance … envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when these costs are high, less …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696268

Incentives Versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Leuven, Edwin; Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sonnemans, Joep; van … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A vast body of empirical studies lends support to the incentive effects of rank-order tournaments. Evidence comes from … tournaments may bias these non-experimental studies, whereas short task duration or lack of distracters may limit the external … where students selected themselves into tournaments with different prizes. Within each tournament the best performing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136509

Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave

Englmaier, Florian; Muehlheusser, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554231

Rotten Kids with Bad Intentions

Netzer, Nick; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We examine a "Rotten Kid" model (Becker 1974) where a player with social preferences interacts with an egoistic player. We assume that social preferences are intention-based rather than outcome-based. In a very general multi-stage setting we show that any equilibrium must involve mutually unkind...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468559

Public Disclosure and Bank Failures

Cordella, Tito; Levy Yeyati, Eduardo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

This paper analyses the impact of public disclosure of banks’ risk exposure on banks’ risk taking incentives and its implications in terms of soundness of the banking system. We find that, when banks have a complete control over the volatility of their loan portfolio, public disclosure...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123714

The Optimality of a Monetary Union Without a Fiscal Union

Beetsma, Roel; Bovenberg, A Lans - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

The paper explores the case for monetary and fiscal unification. Monetary policy suffers from an inflation bias because the monetary authorities are not able to commit. With international risk-sharing in a fiscal union, fiscal discipline suffers from moral hazard. An inflation target alleviates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123736

The Bail-In Problem: Systematic Goals, Ad Hoc Means

Eichengreen, Barry; Ruehl, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

In this paper we analyse the recent efforts of the international financial institutions to limit the moral hazard created by their assistance to crisis countries. We question the wisdom of the case-by-case approach taken in Pakistan, Ecuador, Romania and Ukraine. We show that because default and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124195

Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?

Martinez-Miera, David; Repullo, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A large theoretical literature shows that competition reduces banks' franchise values and induces them to take more risk. Recent research contradicts this result: When banks charge lower rates, their borrowers have an incentive to choose safer investments, so they will in turn be safer. However,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124382

Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition

Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

The paper shows that an increase in competition has two effects on managerial incentives: it increases the probability of liquidation, which has a positive effect on managerial effort, but it also reduces the firm’s profits, which may make it less attractive to induce high effort. Thus, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124445

Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers

Palomino, Frédéric; Prat, Andrea - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

Recent empirical work suggests a strong connection between the incentives money managers are offered and their risk-taking behavior. We develop a general model of delegated portfolio management, with the feature that the agent can control the riskiness of the portfolio. This represents a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504241