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The Intergenerational Transmission of Risk and Trust Attitudes

Dohmen, Thomas J; Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; Sunde, Uwe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Recent theoretical contributions depart from the usual practice of treating individual attitude endowments as a black box, by assuming that these are shaped by the attitudes of parents and other role models. Attitudes include fundamental preferences such as risk preference, and crucial beliefs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124463

Financial Advice and Stock Market Participation

Georgarakos, Dimitris; Inderst, Roman - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We introduce professional financial advice in households’ choice to hold risky financial assets. Consistent with the predictions from a formal model, we present evidence that households’ trust in financial advice only matters when their perceived own financial capability is low. Instead, for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084072

Incentives Versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Leuven, Edwin; Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sonnemans, Joep; van … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A vast body of empirical studies lends support to the incentive effects of rank-order tournaments. Evidence comes from … tournaments may bias these non-experimental studies, whereas short task duration or lack of distracters may limit the external … where students selected themselves into tournaments with different prizes. Within each tournament the best performing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136509

Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?

Martinez-Miera, David; Repullo, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A large theoretical literature shows that competition reduces banks' franchise values and induces them to take more risk. Recent research contradicts this result: When banks charge lower rates, their borrowers have an incentive to choose safer investments, so they will in turn be safer. However,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124382

Capital Requirements, Market Power and Risk-Taking in Banking

Repullo, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper presents a dynamic model of imperfect competition in banking where banks can invest in a prudent or a gambling asset. We show that if intermediation margins are small, the banks’ franchise values will be small, and in the absence of regulation only a gambling equilibrium will exist....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067507

Too Many to Fail - An Analysis of Time Inconsistency in Bank Closure Policies

Acharya, Viral V; Yorulmazer, Tanju - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper shows that bank closure policies suffer from a ‘too-many-to-fail’ problem: when the number of bank failures is large, the regulator finds it ex-post optimal to bail out some or all failed banks, whereas when the number of bank failures is small, failed banks can be acquired by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136753

Pricing and Trust

Huck, Steffen; Ruchala, Gabriele K.; Tyran, Jean-Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We experimentally examine the effects of flexible and fixed prices in markets for experience goods in which demand is driven by trust. With flexible prices, we observe low prices and high quality in competitive (oligopolistic) markets, and high prices coupled with low quality in non-competitive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792278

Public and Private Insurance with Costly Transactions

Bertola, Giuseppe; Koeniger, Winfried - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We characterize how public insurance schemes are constrained by hidden financial transactions. When non-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs, public transfers are only partly offset by hidden private transactions, and can influence consumption allocation. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682880

Regulatory Competition and Bank Risk Taking

Agur, Itai - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

How damaging is competition between bank regulators? This paper models regulators that compete because they want to supervise more banks. Both banks' risk profiles and their access to wholesale funding are endogenous, leading to rich interactions. The sensitivity of regulatory standards to bank...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577817

A Critical Evaluation of Bail-in as a Bank Recapitalisation Mechanism

Avgouleas, Emilios; Goodhart, Charles A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Many of the world’s developed economies have introduced, or are planning to introduce, bank bail-in regimes. Both the planned EU resolution regime and the European Stability Mechanism Treaty involve the participation of bank creditors in bearing the costs of bank recapitalization via the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083962