Similar Search Results

Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment

Karlan, Dean S.; Zinman, Jonathan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice. We estimate the presence and importance of adverse selection and moral hazard in a consumer credit market using a new field experiment methodology. We randomized 58,000 direct mail offers issued by a major...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497798

Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives

Acharya, Viral V; Johnson, Tim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

Insider trading in the credit derivatives market has become a significant concern for regulators and participants. This paper attempts to quantify the problem. Using news reflected in the stock market as a benchmark for public information, we report evidence of significant incremental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666591

Incentives Versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Leuven, Edwin; Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sonnemans, Joep; van … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A vast body of empirical studies lends support to the incentive effects of rank-order tournaments. Evidence comes from … tournaments may bias these non-experimental studies, whereas short task duration or lack of distracters may limit the external … where students selected themselves into tournaments with different prizes. Within each tournament the best performing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136509

Performance Indicators for Quality with Adverse Selection, Gaming and Inequality Aversion

Kuhn, Michael; Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Performance indicators are increasingly used to regulate quality in health care and other areas of the public sector. We develop a model of contracting between a purchaser (principal) and a provider (agent) under the following scenarios: a) higher ability increases quality directly and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123654

Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?

Martinez-Miera, David; Repullo, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A large theoretical literature shows that competition reduces banks' franchise values and induces them to take more risk. Recent research contradicts this result: When banks charge lower rates, their borrowers have an incentive to choose safer investments, so they will in turn be safer. However,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124382

Separating Selection and Incentive Effects in Health Insurance

Gardiol, Lucien; Geoffard, Pierre-Yves; Grandchamp, Chantal - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper provides an analysis of the health insurance and health care consumption. A structural microeconomic model of joint demand for health insurance and health care is developed and estimated using full maximum likelihood method using Swiss insurance claims data for over 60,000 adult...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124425

Is Deposit Insurance A Good Thing, And If So, Who Should Pay for It?

Morrison, Alan; White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Deposit insurance schemes are becoming increasingly popular around the world and yet there is little understanding of how they should be designed and what their consequences are. In this Paper we provide a new rationale for the provision of deposit insurance. We analyse a model in which agents...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136557

Too Many to Fail - An Analysis of Time Inconsistency in Bank Closure Policies

Acharya, Viral V; Yorulmazer, Tanju - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper shows that bank closure policies suffer from a ‘too-many-to-fail’ problem: when the number of bank failures is large, the regulator finds it ex-post optimal to bail out some or all failed banks, whereas when the number of bank failures is small, failed banks can be acquired by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136753

Capital Requirements, Market Power and Risk-Taking in Banking

Repullo, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper presents a dynamic model of imperfect competition in banking where banks can invest in a prudent or a gambling asset. We show that if intermediation margins are small, the banks’ franchise values will be small, and in the absence of regulation only a gambling equilibrium will exist....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067507

Unemployment Insurance Design: Inducing Moving and Retraining

Hassler, John; Mora, Rodríguez; Vicente, José - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Evidence suggests that unemployed individuals can sometimes affect their job prospects by undertaking a costly action like deciding to move or retrain. Realistically, such an opportunity only arises for some individuals and the identity of those may be unobservable ex-ante. The problem of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504238