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Dessein, Wouter; Garicano, Luis; Gertner, Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Multi-product firms create value by integrating functional activities such as manufacturing across business units. This integration often requires making functional managers responsible for implementing standardization, thereby limiting business-unit managers’ authority. Realizing synergies...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114409

Strategic Asset Allocation in Money Management

Basak, Suleyman; Makarov, Dmitry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

Money managers behave strategically when competing for fund flows within relatively small groups. We study strategic interaction between two risk-averse managers in continuous time, characterizing analytically their unique equilibrium dynamic investments. Driven by chasing and contrarian...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144728

Incentives Versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Leuven, Edwin; Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sonnemans, Joep; van … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A vast body of empirical studies lends support to the incentive effects of rank-order tournaments. Evidence comes from … tournaments may bias these non-experimental studies, whereas short task duration or lack of distracters may limit the external … where students selected themselves into tournaments with different prizes. Within each tournament the best performing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136509

Sabotage in Tournaments: Making the Beautiful Game a Bit Less Beautiful

Garicano, Luis; Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We exploit an incentive change in professional soccer leagues aimed at encouraging more attacking and goal scoring to obtain evidence on the effect of stronger incentives on productive and destructive effort. Using as control the behavior of the same teams in a competition that experienced no...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114301

Public and Private Insurance with Costly Transactions

Bertola, Giuseppe; Koeniger, Winfried - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We characterize how public insurance schemes are constrained by hidden financial transactions. When non-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs, public transfers are only partly offset by hidden private transactions, and can influence consumption allocation. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682880

Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083769

A Critical Evaluation of Bail-in as a Bank Recapitalisation Mechanism

Avgouleas, Emilios; Goodhart, Charles A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Many of the world’s developed economies have introduced, or are planning to introduce, bank bail-in regimes. Both the planned EU resolution regime and the European Stability Mechanism Treaty involve the participation of bank creditors in bearing the costs of bank recapitalization via the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083962

Feeling the blues. Moral hazard and debt dilution in Eurobonds before 1914

Esteves, Rui; Tuncer, Ali Coskun - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Debt mutualisation through Eurobonds has been proposed as a solution to the Euro crisis. Although this proposal found some support, it also attracted strong criticisms as it risks raising the spreads for strong countries, diluting legacy debt and promoting moral hazard by weak countries. Because...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084064

Joint Production in Teams

Battaglini, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Consider Holmström.s moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has a a(i)-dimensional strategy space and output can be m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791765

The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees

Emons, Winand; Garoupa, Nuno - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Under contingent fees the attorney gets a share of the judgement; under conditional fees the lawyer gets an upscale premium if the case is won which is, however, unrelated to the adjudicated amount. We compare conditional and contingent fees in a principal-agent framework where the lawyer...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791953