Similar Search Results

Rational Inattention to Subsidies for Charitable Contributions

Scharf, Kimberley; Smith, Sarah L. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

Recent evidence suggests that individuals do not always take notice of tax attributes when making their choices. This paper focuses on the case of tax relief for charitable contributions. Although a fully rational donor should view a matched payment to the receiving charity and a tax rebate of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468705

A "quantum" approach to rational inattention

Saint-Paul, Gilles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

In this paper, I propose a model of rational inattention where the choice variable is a deterministic function of the exogenous variables, and still only a finite amount of information is being used. This holds provided the choice variable is discrete rather than continuous; that is, the mapping...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530353

Optimal Sticky Prices under Rational Inattention

Mackowiak, Bartosz Adam; Wiederholt, Mirko - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper presents a model in which price setting firms optimally decide what to pay attention to, subject to a constraint on information flow. When idiosyncratic conditions are more variable or more important than aggregate conditions, firms pay more attention to idiosyncratic conditions than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792282

Incentives Versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Leuven, Edwin; Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sonnemans, Joep; van … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A vast body of empirical studies lends support to the incentive effects of rank-order tournaments. Evidence comes from … tournaments may bias these non-experimental studies, whereas short task duration or lack of distracters may limit the external … where students selected themselves into tournaments with different prizes. Within each tournament the best performing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136509

Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?

Martinez-Miera, David; Repullo, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A large theoretical literature shows that competition reduces banks' franchise values and induces them to take more risk. Recent research contradicts this result: When banks charge lower rates, their borrowers have an incentive to choose safer investments, so they will in turn be safer. However,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124382

Too Many to Fail - An Analysis of Time Inconsistency in Bank Closure Policies

Acharya, Viral V; Yorulmazer, Tanju - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper shows that bank closure policies suffer from a ‘too-many-to-fail’ problem: when the number of bank failures is large, the regulator finds it ex-post optimal to bail out some or all failed banks, whereas when the number of bank failures is small, failed banks can be acquired by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136753

Capital Requirements, Market Power and Risk-Taking in Banking

Repullo, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper presents a dynamic model of imperfect competition in banking where banks can invest in a prudent or a gambling asset. We show that if intermediation margins are small, the banks’ franchise values will be small, and in the absence of regulation only a gambling equilibrium will exist....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067507

Regulatory Competition and Bank Risk Taking

Agur, Itai - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

How damaging is competition between bank regulators? This paper models regulators that compete because they want to supervise more banks. Both banks' risk profiles and their access to wholesale funding are endogenous, leading to rich interactions. The sensitivity of regulatory standards to bank...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577817

Public and Private Insurance with Costly Transactions

Bertola, Giuseppe; Koeniger, Winfried - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We characterize how public insurance schemes are constrained by hidden financial transactions. When non-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs, public transfers are only partly offset by hidden private transactions, and can influence consumption allocation. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682880

A Critical Evaluation of Bail-in as a Bank Recapitalisation Mechanism

Avgouleas, Emilios; Goodhart, Charles A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Many of the world’s developed economies have introduced, or are planning to introduce, bank bail-in regimes. Both the planned EU resolution regime and the European Stability Mechanism Treaty involve the participation of bank creditors in bearing the costs of bank recapitalization via the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083962