We propose a rational theory of momentum and reversal based on delegated portfolio management. A competitive investor can invest through an index fund or an active fund run by a manager with unknown ability. Following a negative cashflow shock to assets held by the active fund, the investor...

We build an occupational-choice general-equilibrium model of an economy with the non-profit sector financed through private warm-glow donations. Lack of monitoring on the use of funds implies that an increase of funds of the non-profit sector (because of a higher income in the for-profit sector,...

We develop a framework for optimal taxation when agents can earn their income both in traditional activities, where private and social products coincide, and in rent-seeking activities, where private returns exceed social returns either because they involve the capture of pre-existing rents or...

It is now well known that in models with imperfect competition the choice of the normalization rule may have real effects. The scope and the reason of this result are investigated. I first show that a clear distinction must be made between imperfect competition based on quantity versus nominal...

In this paper, we have distinguished three different conceptions of the budget constraint (BC). The first one, introduced by Clower, regards the BC as a universal (unconditional) rational planning postulate. This does not imply market equilibrium or optimality. The second one, advocated by...

We study a general equilibrium model where agents' preferences, productivity and labour endowments depend on their health status, and occupational choices affect individual health distributions. Efficiency typically requires agents of the same type to obtain different expected utilities if...

I study how savers allocate funds between boundedly rational firms which follow simple pricing rules. Firms need cash to pay their inputs in advance, and savers-shareholders allocate cash between them so as to maximize their rate of return. When the rate of return on each firm is observed, there...

We consider a pure exchange economy, where for each good several trading institutions are available, only one of which is market-clearing. The other feasible trading institutions lead to rationing. To learn on which trading institutions to coordinate, traders follow behavioural rules of thumb...

The aim of this paper is to examine, both at partial and general equilibrium, the consequences of work sharing policies, when the wages, the length of the working time and the participation rates are endogenous, in an economy where workers get utility from leisure. It is shown that the effects...