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Political Competition and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence from the United States

Besley, Timothy J.; Persson, Torsten; Sturm, Daniel M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

One of the most cherished propositions in economics is that market competition by and large raises consumer welfare. But whether political competition has similarly virtuous consequences is far less discussed. This paper formulates a model to explain why political competition may enhance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792440

Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model

Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1994

This paper approaches the question of the appropriate level of decentralization of power in government as a problem in the allocation of control rights under incomplete contracts. This approach is preferable to that of the literature following the Tiebout model of local public goods, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792514

Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing them together under a unifying framework. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272716

Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

have power to influence their own compensation, and they use their power to extract rents. As a result, executives are paid … more than is optimal for shareholders and, to camouflage the extraction of rents, executive compensation might be … practices. We conclude that extraction of rents might well play a significant role in US executive compensation; and that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123963

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

, executives have power to influence their own pay, and they use that power to extract rents. Furthermore, the desire to camouflage … rents can explain significant features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that have long been viewed as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a ‘managerial power’ approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

The Intertemporal Spending Behavior of Local Governments : A Comparative Analysis of the Scandinavian Countries.

Borge, L.E.; Dahleberg, M.; Tovmo, P. - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Uppsala Universitet - 2001

The paper investigates the intertemporal spending behavior of Scandinavian local governments with particular attention to liquidity constraints imposed by balanced-budget-rules and other regulations. The main finding is that Danish local governments are more able to smooth current expenditures...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779752

The Institutional Foundations of China’s Reforms and Development

Xu, Cheng-Gang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

China’s economic reforms have resulted in spectacular growth and poverty reduction. However, China’s institutions look ill-suited to achieve such a result, and they indeed suffer from serious shortcomings. To solve "China puzzle" this paper analyses China’s institution - a regionally...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468688

Decentralization and the Productive Efficiency of Government: Evidence from Swiss Cantons

Barankay, Iwan; Lockwood, Ben - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Advocates of fiscal decentralization argue that amongst other benefits, it can increase the efficiency of delivery of government services. This paper is one of the first to evaluate this claim empirically by looking at the association between education expenditure decentralization and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123882

Firms' Decisions on Where to Incorporate

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Cohen, Alma - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper empirically investigates the decisions of US publicly traded firms on where to incorporate. We study the features of states that make them attractive to incorporating firms and the characteristics of firms that determine whether they incorporate in or out of their state of location....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123946

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