Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents
Year of publication: |
2001-12
|
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Authors: | Bebchuk, Lucian Arye ; Fried, Jesse ; Walker, David I |
Institutions: | C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers |
Subject: | agency costs | corporate governance | executive compensation | private benefits of control | rent extraction | stock options |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 3112 |
Classification: | D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; G38 - Government Policy and Regulation ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; J44 - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations ; K22 - Corporation and Securities Law |
Source: |
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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, (2002)
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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, (2003)
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Ganor, Mira, (2012)
- More ...
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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, (2002)
-
Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, (2003)
-
Executive compensation as an agency problem
Bebchuk, Lucian A., (2009)
- More ...