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How to Win a Decision in a Confederation

Jehiel, Philippe; Thisse, Jacques-François - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper deals with collective decision making within a group of independent jurisdictions. The right to choose the public policy is delegated from the central authority of one of the jurisdictions through a bidding procedure among the group members. We identify the following trade-off:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661614

On the performance of rule-based contribution schemes under endowment heterogeneity

Kesternich, Martin; Lange, Andreas; Sturm, Bodo - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2014

We experimentally test different rule-based contribution mechanisms in a repeated 4-player public goods game with endowment heterogeneity and compare them to a VCM, distinguishing between a random- and an effort-based allocation of endowments. We find that endowment heterogeneities limit the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957679

Democratic Public Good Provision

Hassler, John; Storesletten, Kjetil; Zilibotti, Fabrizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper analyses an overlapping generation model of public good provision under repeated voting. The public good is financed through age-dependent taxation that distorts human capital investment. Taxes redistribute income both across different skill groups and across generations. We contrast...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123612

An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups

Cabrales, Antonio; Lugo, Haydée - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We analyze the effect of a large group on an impure public goods model with lotteries. We show that as populations get large, and with selfish preferences, the level of contributions converges to the one given by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences (of the warm glow type), the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008921774

Improving voluntary public good provision by a non-governmental, endogenous matching mechanism: Experimental evidence

Reif, Christiane; Rübbelke, Dirk; Löschel, Andreas - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2014

subjects achieve to implement a norm-enforcement mechanism at their own expense by applying the theory of non-governmental norm … determined enforcement mechanism, we implement a two-stage public good game: At the first stage subjects determine the strength … that the mechanism by Buchholz et al. (2014) leads to a higher public good contribution than without the use of any …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010985626