Showing 1 - 6 of 6
This Paper explores the implications of the recent sharp rise in US wage inequality for welfare and the cross-sectional distributions of hours worked, consumption and earnings. From 1967 to 1996 cross-sectional dispersion of earnings increased more than wage dispersion, due to a rise in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656181
Some existing welfare programs (“work-first”) require participants to work in exchange for benefits. Others (“job search-first”) emphasize private job-search and provide assistance in finding and retaining a durable employment. This paper studies the optimal design of welfare programs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083773
This Paper compares education investment in closed and open economies without government and with a benevolent government. Closed economies suffer from a hold-up problem of excessive redistribution, and governments use education policy as a second-best tool. Globalization that increases labour...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789044
Incomplete information is a commitment device for time consistency problems. In the context of time consistent labour income taxation privacy reduces welfare losses and increases the effectiveness of public education as a second best policy.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789169
We study a setting with search frictions in the marriage market and with incomplete contracting inside the family. Everyone prefers a partner that has a high income and is a perfect emotional match, but compromises must often be struck. A high-income earner may abstain from marrying a low-income...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791664
A Welfare-to-Work (WTW) program is a mix of government expenditures on various labor market policies targeted to the unemployed (e.g., unemployment insurance, job search monitoring, social assistance, wage subsidies). This paper provides a dynamic principal-agent framework suitable for analyzing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661766