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Independence before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design

Hughes Hallett, Andrew; Weymark, Diana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and fiscal policy are implemented in the second stage. When fiscal policy is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498019

The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective

Clarida, Richard; Galí, Jordi; Gertler, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

This paper reviews the recent literature on monetary policy rules. We exposit the monetary policy design problem within a simple baseline theoretical framework. We then consider the implications of adding various real world complications. Among other things, we show that the optimal policy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666476

Monetary Policy Issues in a Low Inflation Environment

Viñals, José - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

One of the most striking macroeconomic phenomena in recent decades has been the achievement of rather low and more stable rates of inflation in many countries. Consequently, the main goal of this Paper is to offer an overview of the main policy issues arising in a low inflation environment and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666924

The Advantages of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility

Giavazzi, Francesco; Pagano, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1986

this question appropriately, one must consider that EMS membership brings potentially large credibility gains to policy … inefficiency stemming from the public's mistrust for the authorities. We study the conditions under which these credibility gains …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791653

Workers' Versus Bankers' Europe (II): Policy Externalities and Credibility in EMU

Bottazzi, Laura; Manasse, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

In this paper we analyse how the creation of a single currency regime changes the strategic relationship between policy-makers, both within and across countries. In particular we look at the role of cross-country externalities and lack of commitment. When labour taxation is excessive, due to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136411

Convergence and Anchoring of Yield Curves in the Euro Area

Ehrmann, Michael; Fratzscher, Marcel; Gürkaynak, Refet S. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

the credibility that financial markets attach to monetary policy in the euro area. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067658

Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy

Persson, Torsten; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

This paper surveys the recent literature on the theory of macroeconomic policy. We study the effect of various … incentive constraints on the policy-making process, such as lack of credibility, political opportunism, political ideology, and …, and focuses on credibility, political business cycles, and optimal design of monetary institutions. Part II deals with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498016

Capital Accumulation, Inflation and Long-Run Conflict in International Objectives

van der Ploeg, Frederick - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1986

-commitment. Coordination can be futile, since it exacerbates the lack of credibility perceived by the private sectors. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504714

The Term Structure of Interest Rates, Structural Stability and Macroeconomic Policy Changes in the UK

Driffill, John - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1990

credibility in order to discover the period from 1959-87 using quarterly data. A stochastic regime switching model used by …, on a number of basic tests. Their relationship with yields on treasury bills, however, is not consistent with the theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005281377

Delegation of Monetary Policy: More than a Relocation of the Time-Inconsistency Problem

Driffill, John; Rotondi, Zeno - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

It has been argued that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank, which acts as an agent for the government, does not mitigate the problem of time-inconsistency, but merely relocates it. We argue here that this is not so, and that delegation enables a wider class of economies...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656362

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