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Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on performance pay and other high-powered incentives, thereby shifting effort … incentives downward in order to extract rents. More generally, as declining market frictions lead employers to compete more …, while inequality tends to rise monotonically. Bonus caps and income taxes can help restore balance in agents' incentives and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083769

Joint Production in Teams

Battaglini, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Consider Holmström.s moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has a a(i)-dimensional strategy space and output can be m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791765

The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees

Emons, Winand; Garoupa, Nuno - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

. Contingent fees provide better incentives than conditional fees independently of whether upfront payments are restricted to be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791953

Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principle-Agent Model

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114195

Unemployment Insurance Design: Inducing Moving and Retraining

Hassler, John; Mora, Rodríguez; Vicente, José - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Evidence suggests that unemployed individuals can sometimes affect their job prospects by undertaking a costly action like deciding to move or retrain. Realistically, such an opportunity only arises for some individuals and the identity of those may be unobservable ex-ante. The problem of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504238

Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers

Palomino, Frédéric; Prat, Andrea - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

Recent empirical work suggests a strong connection between the incentives money managers are offered and their risk ….Recent empirical work suggests a strong connection between the incentives money managers are offered and their risk-taking behavior. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504241

The Labour Market and Corporate Structure

Acemoglu, Daron; Newman, Andrew - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

This paper analyses the impact of labour demand and labour market regulations on the corporate structure of fims. It finds that higher wages are associated with lower monitoring, irrespective of whether these high wages are caused by labour market regulations, unions or higher labour demand....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504251

A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care

Bolhaar, Jonneke; Lindeboom, Maarten; van der Klaauw, Bas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504294

Risk-bearing and Entrepreneurship

Newman, Andrew - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

In the 'Knightian' theory of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs provide insurance to workers by paying fixed wages and bear all the risk of production. This paper endogenizes entrepreneurial risk by allowing for optimal insurance contracts as well as the occupational self-selection. Moral hazard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504306

Relating Output and Volatility in a Model of International Risk-Sharing with Limited Commitment

Reichlin, Pietro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

I study the constrained efficient allocations of a simple model of risk sharing and capital flows across countries assuming that each country cannot commit to fully repay its contract obligations. In the model, the degree of risk sharing and the amount of investment are interdependent. It is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504378