We characterize the optimal renegotiation-proof contract in a dynamic Principal-Agent model in which the type of the … agent may change stochastically over time. Contrary to the case with constant types, the ex ante optimal contract may be …

This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in … closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives … utility, a pecuniary cost of effort, Gaussian noise or continuous time. The contract's functional form is independent of the …

may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the optimal contract in a setting where the CEO can affect firm value … through both productive effort and costly manipulation, and may undo the contract by privately saving. The optimal contract …

The paper sees countertrade - the tying of trade flows - as an insurance contract that mitigates contractual hazards … investment. This way tying is seen as a commitment device against renegotiation during contract execution when investments are …

proportional elections. A tax contract specifies a range of tax rates a party is committed to if in government. We develop a new …