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Technological Foundations of Political Instability

Dagaev, Dmitry; Lamberova, Natalia; Sobolev, Anton; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

There has been a wide-spread belief that elections with a wide franchise following removal of an oppressive dictator lead to establishment of a government that is not vulnerable to mass protest. At the same time, most of the post-World War II non-constitutional exits of recently-installed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084185

Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans

Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656134

Public Action for Public Goods

Banerjee, Abhijit; Iyer, Lakshmi; Somanathan, Rohini - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper focuses on the relationship between public action and access to public goods. It begins by developing a simple model of collective action which is intended to capture the various mechanisms that are discussed in the theoretical literature on collective action. We argue that several of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662369

Culture, Institutions and Democratization

Gorodnichenko, Yuriy; Roland, Gérard - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We construct a model of revolution and transition to democracy under an individualistic and a collectivist culture. The main result is that, despite facing potentially larger collective action problems, countries with an individualistic culture are more likely to end up adopting democracy faster...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011266531

Shanghai’s Trade, China’s Growth: Continuity, Recovery, and Change since the Opium War

Keller, Wolfgang; Li, Ben; Shiue, Carol Hua - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

In this paper, we provide aggregate trends in China’s trade performance from the 1840s to the present. Based on historical benchmarks, we argue that China’s recent gains are not exclusively due to the reforms since 1978. Rather, foreign economic activity can be understood by developments...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084171

A Colonial Legacy of African Gender Inequality? Evidence from Christian Kampala, 1895-2011

Meier zu Selhausen, Felix; Weisdorf, Jacob - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

The colonial legacy of African underdevelopment is widely debated but hard to document. We use occupational statistics from Protestant marriage registers of historical Kampala to investigate the hypothesis that African gender inequality and female disempowerment are rooted in colonial times. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145474

Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger Control

Neven, Damien J; Röller, Lars-Hendrik - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

antitrust agency and where transparency - while making lobbying less effective - also implies real resource costs. We examine … regulatory failures. We find that under a welfare standard, lobbying leads to the clearance of relatively inefficient mergers … relatively efficient mergers that would increase welfare (i.e. there is a type I error). Lobbying actually reduces the extent to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124327

Multidimensional Cheap Talk

Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

In this Paper we extend the cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) to a multidimensional state space and policy space. We provide a characterization of equilibria. We focus on the question of feasibility of information transmission, for large degrees of conflict of interests between the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067454

On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control

Heidhues, Paul; Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067524

Political Economics and Public Finance

Persson, Torsten; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

: we study legislative bargaining, lobbying, and electoral competition, as well as the possible interactions between these …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067583