Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans

We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action.

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Year of publication:	2007-06
Authors:	Konrad, Kai A. ; Leininger, Wolfgang
Institutions:	C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Subject:	collective action \| defence \| distributional conflict \| free-riding \| norms \| war

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CEPR Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 6333
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656134